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stressing the oneness of husband and wife too much, it was held no words in a conveyance to husband and wife could prevent them taking as tenants by entireties. *Dias v. Glover*, 1 Hoff. Ch. 71 (but see, *contra*, *Hicks v. Cochran*, 4 Edw. Ch. 107); *Stuckey v. Keefe*, 26 Pa. St. 397. On the contrary there were not lacking judicial declarations in accord with Preston's view. *McDermott v. French*, 15 N. J. Eq. 78; *Hoffman v. Stigers*, 28 Iowa 302, 310; *Brown v. Brown*, 133 Ind. 476. Since the Married Women's Acts there cannot be any question left. Even in Pennsylvania it is now held that a conveyance to husband and wife may create a tenancy in common. *Blease v. Anderson*, 241 Pa. St. 198.

INTERNATIONAL LAW—DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGE—WAIVER WITH LEAVE OF SOVEREIGN.—Francisco Suarez died intestate in England in 1797 possessed of considerable property. Plaintiff and defendant each claimed to be one of the next-of-kin and entitled to share in the intestate's personality. In 1900 defendant obtained letters of administration and appointed plaintiff his attorney to collect moneys due to the estate abroad. In 1914 plaintiff issued an originating summons asking for an account and for the administration of the personal estate by the Court. Service of summons was accepted by defendant's solicitors and an appearance entered in due course. The first hearing was adjourned to enable counsel to ascertain whether defendant intended to claim privilege as Minister for Bolivia. Counsel informed the Court presently that defendant waived his diplomatic privilege. Later defendant's counsel wrote plaintiff's counsel that waiver of privilege had been authorized by the President of Bolivia. The order for administration was made. Plaintiff appealed from the order, defendant gave notice of a cross-contention, and the order was varied to give effect to the contentions of both parties. The accounts showed large sums due from defendant. Two sums were lodged in Court, one in pursuance to an order and the other voluntarily. Defendant also submitted to be surcharged with a large sum to be paid in instalments. He defaulted on the first instalment, and was personally served with an order to attend before the Master for examination as to his means. A supplemental order was made that defendant pay the entire amount into Court. The next day he left the country. Plaintiff took out a summons for leave to proceed to execution and to issue a writ of sequestration against the property of defendant. The application was refused on the ground of defendant's diplomatic privilege. The summons was permitted to stand over, however, with liberty to restore in the event of defendant ceasing to hold diplomatic office. Four months later the British Foreign Office informed plaintiff's counsel that defendant's appointment as Minister had been terminated. Plaintiff restored his summons, his application was granted, and defendant appealed. It was argued for defendant that the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708 made writ and process utterly null and void, and that a waiver of privilege, even with the sovereign's consent, could not confer a jurisdiction which did not exist. *Held*, that the order for the issue of the writ of sequestration was properly made. *In re Suarez* (1907), 87 L. J. Ch. 173.

Diplomats enjoy immunity from suit, even in cases where neither person nor property are immediately affected. *Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin* (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 310. The immunity continues for a reasonable time after termination of the appointment to enable the diplomat to hand over the office to his successor and return to his country. *Musurus Bey v. Gadban* (1894), 63 L. J. Q. B. 621. The report of the Foreign Office as to the status of foreign dignitaries and their representatives is conclusive. *Mighell v. Sultan of Johore* (1893), 63 L. J. Q. B. 593 (status of foreign sovereign); *Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate* (1900), 69 L. J. Ch. 375 (status and boundaries of foreign state). Lord Talbot's dictum that diplomatic immunity cannot be waived applies only to waiver without leave of the Sovereign. See *Barbuit's Case* (1737), Cas. t. Talb. 281. The Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708 is merely declaratory of the common law, of which the law of nations is to be deemed a part. *Triquet v. Bath* (1764), 3 Burr. Diplomatic privilege under the law of nations may be waived with the permission of the diplomat's Government. The opinion suggests that the diplomat is the proper source of information with regard to this permission.

INTERNATIONAL LAW—REQUISITION BY FOREIGN SOVEREIGN—IMMUNITY FROM PROCESS.—The "Roserie," a privately owned ship, collided with a barge belonging to the libellants who subsequently attempted to enforce a lien through process and seizure. The ship was released on bond. It appeared from the statement of amici curiae (counsel for the British Embassy) that at the time of the collision the ship was requisitioned as a British transport and that the arrest would "interfere with the government business upon which said vessel is engaged." Held, that by rule of comity the vessel was exempt during its requisition. To permit the arrest would be inconsistent with the dignity and independence of sovereignty which must not be "hampered or interfered with in the use of such instrumentalities." *The "Roserie,"* 254 Fed. 854 (Dist. Ct. D., New Jersey, 1918).

The court refused to be led by the per curiam opinion in *The "Attualita,"* 238 Fed. 909, which did not recognize immunity for a ship in the employment of the Italian government, on the ground that the Italian government would not be liable for the wrong done by the vessel. That court failed to realize the hazard of preferring a local claim for damages over the public purpose of a foreign sovereign. As a rule the municipal courts are extremely careful to uphold the foreign sovereign in the protection of its public purposes as against the local demands for private redress. In *The "Parlement Belge,"* Ct. of Appeals, L. R. 5 Prob. Div. 197, the proceeding was in rem against a public mail-packet of the Belgian government. It was argued by the claimants that a proceeding in rem was against the vessel only and not against the sovereign. The court, however, realized that the property must be considered as property belonging to someone. The municipal principle as to proceedings in rem had to give way when the owner was a foreign sovereign. It could not be supposed that the sovereign was not indirectly impleaded. To attempt to exercise such authority would be "inconsistent with the independence and equality of the state which is represented by such owner."